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INTRODUCTION 
With the technological advancements in global communications, 
contractual arrangements created by electronic transactions are 
becoming more commonplace.  Electronic contractual arrangements 
have, however, raised complex legal issues unprecedented in the law.  
Courts must now confront worldwide access to agreements via Web 
pages, e-mails, and CD-ROMs, and legal doctrines must be consistently 
tested and reapplied to address the new forms of contracting stimulated 
by advancing technology. 
Technology’s impact on traditional contract law doctrine is readily 
apparent in the dilemmas generated by recent developments in 
computer software, hardware, and Internet transactions.  In such 
transactions, sellers have increasingly begun utilizing clickwrap 
agreements, whereby standard terms and conditions are displayed on 
the computer screen when the user attempts to access the seller’s 
services.  In a clickwrap agreement, the seller’s terms typically pop up 
before a purchased software disc can be installed (CD clickwrap) or 
while a service is being requested on the Internet.1  The term 
“clickwrap” evolved from the use of “shrinkwrap” agreements, which 
are agreements wrapped in shrinkwrap cellophane within computer 
software packaging, and that, by their terms, become effective following 
the expiration of a predefined return period for the software (typically 
thirty days).2  Because of such evolution, as well as the many similarities 
between shrinkwrap and clickwrap, courts addressing the enforceability 
of clickwrap agreements have relied upon the case law surrounding 
shrinkwrap cases in formulating their decisions.3  Accordingly, any 
writing discussing the particulars of clickwrap agreements will be 
peppered with an occasional shrinkwrap case, and this Article proves no 
different. 
The enforceability of clickwrap terms, which are often not known to 
the user until after payment, has become a subject of much debate in the 
 
 1. See Mortgage Plus, Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2582-GTV-DJW, 2004 WL 
2331918, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2004); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. 
Supp. 2d 328, 337 (D. Mass. 2002); Kaustuv M. Das, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in 
Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and the “Reasonably Communicated” 
Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 497 (2002); Dawn Davidson, Comment, Click and Commit:  
What Terms Are Users Bound to When They Enter Websites?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1171, 1181–82 (2000). 
 2. Mortgage Plus, Inc., 2004 WL 2331918, at *4; Davidson, supra note 1, at 1180–82. 
 3. Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 476 (2002). 
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courts.4  Because many of the clickwrap cases have been fact-based 
decisions with seemingly contradictory conclusions, various scholarly 
and academic writings have pointed out the need for a heightened 
degree of clarity and certainty concerning the enforceability of 
clickwrap agreements.5  Some scholars contend, for instance, that even 
the federal appellate circuits6 are split on whether clickwrap agreements 
are enforceable.7 
The aim of this Article is to provide clarity to the clickwrap debate 
and to argue that the legal reasoning behind the various clickwrap 
decisions has, in fact, been relatively consistent.  More importantly, this 
Article illustrates that clickwrap agreements are a legitimate form of 
contracting, and that objections to clickwrap are substantially no 
different than objections to most other forms of contracts. 
In analyzing clickwrap cases, one can easily become entangled in 
various disputes, such as the applicability of prevailing Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) provisions or whether the UCC applies at all.  
This Article endeavors to slice through such entanglements and 
identifies four critical issues at the heart of the clickwrap debate:  (1) the 
requirement for notice of contractual terms, (2) the necessary 
opportunity to review and reject the terms, (3) the impact of adhesion 
doctrines on standardized contracts, and (4) the effect of prior written 
agreements on clickwrap.  The first two issues, “notice of terms” and 
“review and rejection,” are, of course, necessary ingredients in 
establishing a manifestation of contractual assent.8  Accordingly, Parts I 
and II of this Article are dedicated to questions of whether a meeting of 
the minds can be formulated in a purely electronic agreement.  
Specifically, Part I of this Article will briefly discuss the general legality 
of electronic transactions and the reason that buyer assent to clickwrap 
 
 4. James C. Hoye, Note, Click—Do We Have a Deal?, 6 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. 
ADVOC. 163, 165 (2001); Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or 
“Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet 
Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5TH 309 (2003). 
 5. Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a 
Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 113 & n.343 (2003); William J. Condon, Jr., Comment, Electronic 
Assent to Online Contracts:  Do Courts Consistently Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 
REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 434 (2004); Das, supra note 1, at 504–05; Hoye, supra note 4, at 165. 
 6. There are currently no Supreme Court decisions related to the enforceability of 
clickwrap.  Condon, supra note 5, at 446. 
 7. Bartow, supra note 5, at 113 & n.343; Ron Corbett, IP Strategies for Start-Up 
Ecommerce Companies in the Post-Dot-Bomb Era, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 643, 661–62 & 
n.136 (2002). 
 8. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 430–31 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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remains an issue.  Part II provides an in-depth discussion of mutual 
assent in clickwrap, specifically the above mentioned requirements of 
notice and the requisite ability to review and reject.  In exploring the 
issues of notice and the ability to reject, Part II will necessarily consider 
the impact of such factors on both online and CD clickwrap.  Next, Part 
III will assess the contract of adhesion questions that are inherent in 
clickwrap agreements, and Part IV will follow with a discussion 
concerning the impact on clickwrap of prior written agreements. 
I.  THE VALIDITY OF ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS AND THE 
REMAINING QUESTION OF ASSENT IN CLICKWRAP 
A.  UETA and the Enforceability of Electronic Documents 
The enforceability of a written provision in downloadable electronic 
form has been settled by the passage and adoption of the Uniform 
Electronic Transaction Act (UETA)9 and the Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign Act).10  The E-Sign Act 
provides that “a signature, contract, or other record relating to such 
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability 
solely because it is in electronic form.”11  The UETA, which is of similar 
purpose as the E-Sign Act, was passed by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 1999,12 and it has been 
adopted by all but four states.13  The UETA reiterates the E-Sign Act by 
stating that a “contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability 
solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.”14  It is of 
some importance to note that the E-Sign Act preempts state law only in 
those states that have not enacted sections 1 through 16 of the UETA.15 
 
 9. Valerie Watnick, The Electronic Formation of Contracts and the Common Law 
“Mailbox Rule,” 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 189–90 (2004).  See generally UNIF. ELEC. 
TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), 7A(I) U.L.A. 225 (2002). 
 10. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 
114 Stat. 464 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–7031 (2000)); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns 
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26 n.11 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(1); Specht, 306 F.3d at 27 n.11. 
 12. See generally UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 1–16; Watnick, supra note 9, at 
189. 
 13. Only Alaska, Georgia, New York, and Washington have not enacted the UETA.  
Baker & McKenzie, Global E-Commerce Law, UETA State-by-State Comparison Table, 
http://www.bakernet.com/ecommerce/uetacomp.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2007); see also, e.g., 
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 43.001–.021 (Vernon 2002). 
 14. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 7; see Watnick, supra note 9, at 189. 
 15. Watnick, supra note 9, at 191. 
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Neither the E-Sign Act nor the UETA is intended to displace 
existing contract law doctrines.16  Consequently, both acts leave the 
determination as to whether mutual assent has occurred in an electronic 
transaction to general contract law.17  Notably, the official comment to 
the UETA cites section 3 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts that 
an agreement cannot be established without a manifestation of mutual 
assent and that a determination of such assent is to be made in the 
context of the specific circumstances.18 
B.  The Impersonal Nature of Clickwrap:  A “Meeting of the Minds” in 
the Absence of Communication 
The debate on the enforceability of clickwrap has predominantly 
occurred with regard to the doctrine of assent.  The mutuality of assent 
or a meeting of the minds is essential to the formation of an enforceable 
contract.19  Whether it is executed electronically or via a physical 
document, a transaction, in order to be a contract, requires a 
manifestation of agreement between the parties.20  The impersonal 
nature of clickwrap agreements, however, raises substantive questions 
with regard to contractual assent.  In a clickwrap agreement, the same 
terms are presented to all users, and “the parties do not meet face-to-
face or personally communicate.”21  Considering such an impersonal 
method of contracting, can there be assurances that a meeting of the 
minds has actually occurred?22  To phrase the question more precisely, 
do clickwrap agreements represent a meeting of the minds under 
traditional contract law? 
 
 16. Id. at 192. 
 17. Id. at 190–92. 
 18. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2 cmt. 1; Watnick, supra note 9, at 190. 
 19. Hatch v. Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124, 133 (1879); Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29, 47 
(1876); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1981). 
 20. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2002); Forrest v. 
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1011 (D.C. 2002). 
 21. Wei Wei Jeang & Ronin A. Brooks, Current On-Line Issues, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 615, 623 (2002). 
 22. Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 492 (arguing that a meeting of the minds cannot occur 
in this context). 
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II.  MUTUAL ASSENT IN CLICKWRAP:  THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE 
AND THE RIGHT TO REVIEW AND REJECT 
A.  The Validity of Online Clickwrap:  Determining Conspicuous Notice 
and the Ability to Reject 
1.  Constructive Notice in Online Clickwrap 
The seminal case regarding assent in Internet-based contracts is 
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.23  In Specht, defendant 
Netscape Communications Corp. (Netscape) invited users to download 
free copies of its software program, SmartDownload, which it had made 
available on its Web site.24  By clicking on an icon that indicated their 
desire to obtain SmartDownload, users were able to download 
Netscape’s software onto their hard drives.25  Netscape argued that by 
accessing SmartDownload, such users had consented to the license 
terms that Netscape had identified on its Web site.26  Netscape did not, 
however, require users to click an “I agree” icon (or a similar form of 
physical acceptance) prior to accessing SmartDownload.27  On the 
contrary, the only reference to Netscape’s license agreement appeared 
in the text of a link well below the software download symbol.28  Such 
text urged users to “‘[p]lease review and agree to the terms of the 
Netscape SmartDownload software license agreement before 
downloading and using the software.’”29  The text of this link was visible 
to users only when they scrolled down to the bottom of the 
SmartDownload Web page.30  The central issue of the case, according to 
the court, was whether the user plaintiffs had constructive notice of the 
terms of Netscape’s agreement.31 
In light of the features of Netscape’s Web site and the location of its 
terms, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Netscape 
had not provided sufficient notice of its terms to demonstrate a user’s 
manifestation of assent to Netscape’s licensing agreement.32  In 
formulating its holding and analyzing the enforceability of online 
 
 23. Specht, 306 F.3d at 17; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 481–83. 
 24. Specht, 306 F.3d at 21–22. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 27. 
 27. Id. at 31–32. 
 28. Id. at 23. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 27, 31–32. 
 32. Id. at 35. 
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contracts, the court established a two-tiered requirement of “reasonably 
conspicuous notice” and “unambiguous manifestation of assent.”33  The 
court maintained that “[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence 
of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those 
terms . . . are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and 
credibility.”34  Without such reasonably conspicuous terms, the court 
declared that electronic contracts cannot “be analogized to those in the 
paper world of arm’s-length bargaining.”35  The principles of 
constructive notice apply “equally to the emergent world of online 
product delivery, pop-up screens, hyperlinked pages, clickwrap 
licensing, scrollable documents, and urgent admonitions to ‘Download 
Now!’”36 
The court did acknowledge Netscape’s argument that the position of 
the computer scroll bar could have indicated to users that further 
information remained below the SmartDownload icon.37  The court 
held, however, that simply because a user may have known additional 
information existed below the icon did not mean that the user should 
have reasonably concluded that a license agreement appeared in such a 
location.38  The court pointed out that there was no reason to assume 
users would scroll down or through computer screens just because they 
were there.39  A reference to the existence of terms on a related or 
associated screen is not, according to the court, sufficient to place a user 
on constructive notice of such terms.40  The Second Circuit concluded 
that clicking on Netscape’s SmartDownload button could not 
communicate a user’s assent to Netscape’s agreement when the user was 
not provided conspicuous notice of the terms of such agreement.41 
2.  Requiring the Buyer to Click “I Agree”:  Distinguishing Clickwrap 
from Browsewrap 
In establishing its two-tiered test, the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Specht42 effectively differentiated between an enforceable clickwrap 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 32. 
 36. Id. at 31. 
 37. Id. at 31–32. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 29–30, 35. 
 42. Id. at 35. 
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agreement and what has become commonly known as browsewrap.43  
Clickwrap is now defined by the courts as an electronic agreement that 
automatically presents contractual terms to a user and requires the user 
to affirmatively click an “I agree” icon prior to the agreement taking 
effect.44  Browsewrap, conversely, refers to a contractual situation 
similar to that found in Specht,45 whereby a vendor places its terms 
somewhere on its Web site without automatically requiring users to 
accept such terms.46 
From a marketing perspective, it is not difficult to understand why 
vendors would want to avoid forcing a user to sort through a legal 
document prior to purchasing their product or service.47  In establishing 
legal enforceability, however, a seller’s use of a browsewrap agreement 
carries a substantial risk.  In the Second Circuit’s decision in Specht, for 
instance, the court specifically expounded on the fact that no true 
clickwrap agreement accompanied the SmartDownload software.48  
Instead of a clickwrap agreement that conspicuously presented its terms 
and required users to affirmatively click their assent, the court noted 
that Netscape’s users were required to browse through the company’s 
Web site in order to access the accompanying agreement.49  By utilizing 
a browsewrap format for its agreement, Netscape failed to give 
sufficient notice of the terms of its agreement, and as a result, 
Netscape’s contract was found to be unenforceable.50 
3.  Deep Linking into Web Sites:  The Ability to Bypass Terms Vacates 
a Finding of Assent 
The requirement of notice of terms is especially apparent in cases 
involving “deep linking” into Web sites.51  Deep linking, which involves 
bypassing a vendor’s home page and linking directly into the interior of 
its Web site, was the primary issue of concern in Ticketmaster Corp. v. 
 
 43. Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 475–76, 482–83. 
 44. Specht, 306 F.3d at 22; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 476. 
 45. Specht, 306 F.3d at 23. 
 46. Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 476. 
 47. David L. Hitchcock & Kathy E. Needleman, Current Status of Copyright Protection 
in the Digital Age and Related Topics, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 539, 588 (2002). 
 48. Specht, 306 F.3d at 23, 25. 
 49. Id. at 22–23. 
 50. Id. at 35. 
 51. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 
525390, at *1–3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), aff’d, 2 F. App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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Tickets.Com, Inc.52  In Ticketmaster Corp., the Web site of plaintiff 
Ticketmaster provided its customers with the ability to purchase tickets 
to its events.53  The home page of Ticketmaster’s Web site also 
contained a user agreement stipulating the terms and conditions for use 
of its Web site.54 
Defendant Tickets.Com also performed consumer ticket services, 
but in a somewhat different manner.  Tickets.Com supplied an 
informational service regarding available tickets to specific events, and a 
link was given to customers to access the Web sites of the related ticket 
providers.55  With regard to accessing Ticketmaster’s services, the link 
provided by Tickets.Com transferred the customer directly to the 
interior of the Ticketmaster Web site, thereby bypassing Ticketmaster’s 
home page and its accompanying agreement.56  Ticketmaster brought 
breach of contract claims against Tickets.Com on the basis of the terms 
and conditions on Ticketmaster’s home page.57  The pertinent terms of 
the agreement provided that any entity going beyond the home page 
agreed to the terms and conditions therein, including provisions that the 
information was for personal use only, was not to be used for 
commercial purposes, and that no deep linking was allowed.58 
The court rejected Ticketmaster’s claim and specifically contrasted 
Ticketmaster’s Web site agreement with that of a typical clickwrap 
agreement.59  The court pointed out that although many Web sites 
require the user to click on an icon agreeing to specific terms and 
conditions, Ticketmaster’s site did not.60  Further, the court stated that 
the terms were set forth in a manner that required the customer to scroll 
through the home page just to find and read them.61  More importantly, 
if a user bypassed the home page, Ticketmaster’s terms never appeared, 
and the court asserted that no individual can reasonably be expected to 
agree to unknown terms.62  The court concluded, not surprisingly, that 
Ticketmaster failed to give conspicuous notice of the terms of the 
 
 52. Id. at *1–2. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at *3. 
 58. Id. at *1–3. 
 59. Id. at *3. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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agreement, and without such notice, an unambiguous manifestation of 
assent to such terms could not occur.63  Much like Netscape in Specht, 
Ticketmaster could not verify assent to its agreement because it could 
not verify that its users had knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of the 
agreement’s terms.64 
4.  The Necessary Opportunity to Reject:  Invalidating “Assent Now, 
Terms Later” Contracts 
Inherent in the ability to give unambiguous and affirmative assent is 
also the ability to reject.  In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,65 the users’ 
inability to reject an agreement served to invalidate the plaintiff’s online 
contract.66  The plaintiff, Register.com, provided services through its 
Web site to search for entities that had registered Internet domain 
names.67  Subsequent to each search result, Register.com’s terms of use 
were automatically provided to the user.68 
The Second Circuit ruled that such “assent now, terms later” 
contracts are not enforceable because they eliminate the user’s 
necessary ability to reject the agreement.69  “A party cannot,” the court 
declared, “manifest assent to the terms and conditions of a contract 
prior to having an opportunity to review them; a party must be given 
some opportunity to reject or assent.”70  The court noted that 
Register.com did not utilize a standard clickwrap agreement, whereby 
access to its services would be withheld until a party affirmatively 
assented to its terms.71  On the contrary, by the time Register.com had 
presented its terms of agreement, it had already provided its services.72  
Under such an agreement, the court stated that the user would have no 
opportunity to reject Register.com’s terms and “would be bound to 
comply with them irrespective of actual assent.”73  Importantly, the court 
held that even multiple search submissions on Register.com’s Web site 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 66. Id. at 430–31. 
 67. Id. at 395. 
 68. Id. at 395–98. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 430. 
 71. Id. at 429. 
 72. Id. at 431. 
 73. Id. 
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would not necessarily equate to assent to its terms.74  Although repeated 
exposure would have put the users on notice that Register.com’s terms 
existed, it is also arguable that each time a user utilized Register.com’s 
services, the user could reject such terms and never manifest assent.75  
While Register.com’s automatic presentation of terms obviously met the 
first requirement in Specht76 of conspicuous notice, its online contract 
clearly failed the second test of unambiguous manifestation of assent.77 
5.  Confirming the Validity of Online Clickwrap 
When an online agreement meets the two-part test of “conspicuous 
notice” and “explicit assent” (to include the ability to reject), the courts 
have accordingly held such agreements to be valid and enforceable.78  By 
automatically presenting its terms and conditions, an online clickwrap 
agreement undoubtedly provides the user with conspicuous notice of its 
terms.79  Additionally, a manifestation of assent is unambiguous when 
the user is required to click a link verifying agreement following the 
presentation of such terms.80  Importantly, the user is also provided a full 
opportunity to review and reject such terms prior to receiving the 
accompanying product or service.81 
For example, in Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.,82 the Superior 
Court of New Jersey upheld Microsoft’s online subscriber agreement 
that required a user to click “I agree” to an obligatory number of terms 
prior to accessing services.83  The court ruled that such users were “given 
ample opportunity to affirmatively assent to the [agreement] . . . and 
‘retained the option of rejecting the contract with impunity.’”84 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 77. Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 431; Specht, 306 F.3d at 35. 
 78. Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 486–87; Condon, supra note 5, at 454–56. 
 79. The phrase “online clickwrap agreement” should be differentiated from the 
previously described browsewrap agreements, “assent now, terms later” contracts, and 
clickwrap agreements that permit deep linking.  Specht, 306 F.3d at 23, 25, 30, 35.  A true 
online clickwrap agreement automatically presents the terms of the contract, cannot be 
bypassed by deep linking into the seller’s Web site, and forces the user to click an acceptance 
icon prior to receiving services.  Id.; see also Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 429–30; 
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 525390, at 
*1–3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), aff’d, 2 F. App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 80. See Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 486–87; Condon, supra note 5, at 454–56. 
 81. See sources cited supra note 80. 
 82. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.,732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
 83. Id. at 530–31. 
 84. Id. at 531. 
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Similarly, in Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,85 the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that by clicking an “accept” 
button after scrolling through the mandatory terms of Verizon’s 
Internet subscriber agreement, the subscriber had sufficiently 
demonstrated assent to Verizon’s agreement.86  In support of its opinion, 
the court stated decisively that “[a] contract is no less a contract simply 
because it is entered into via a computer.”87 
The necessary opportunity to review and reject was also specifically 
addressed in Moore v. Microsoft Corp.88 when a New York appellate 
court ruled that Microsoft’s clickwrap agreement was a binding 
contract.89  In dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against Microsoft, the 
court noted that the plaintiff was provided the opportunity to read and 
reject Microsoft’s contract at leisure.90  By clicking the “I agree” icon 
after such an opportunity, the plaintiff clearly manifested assent to 
Microsoft’s agreement.91 
The courts in online clickwrap cases have, therefore, established two 
critical factors in determining the enforceability of Internet contracts.  
First, there must be conspicuous notice of the agreement’s terms, and 
such terms must be presented prior to the user accessing the related 
product or service.92  Second, a user’s manifestation of assent must be 
unambiguous, and such unambiguous assent cannot be confirmed 
without the prior ability to review and reject the terms of the 
agreement.93  If, however, an affirmative response to both these tests is 
required to validate online agreements, how then can CD clickwrap 
agreements, which are generally not reviewed by the buyer until after 
purchase, be considered a legitimate form of contracting?  If the ability 
to review and reject prior to accessing services is a requirement of an 
enforceable electronic agreement, is it still possible that CD clickwrap 
could also be held enforceable?  The answer is yes, and the legal 
reasoning behind such a holding is the subject of the next section. 
 
 85. Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002). 
 86. Id. at 1010–11. 
 87. Id. at 1011. 
 88. Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
 89. Id. at 92. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Forrest, 805 A.2d at 1010–11, 1013; Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.LC., 732 A.2d 
528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Moore, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 92. 
 93. Moore, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 92. 
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B.  The Enforceability of CD Clickwrap:  Notice on the Outside, Terms 
on the Inside, and a Right to Return 
1.  Required Notice of Subsequent Terms and an Ability to Reject by 
Return 
Much like the case law involving online agreements, the requirement 
for notice of terms prior to purchase becomes essential in establishing 
the enforceability of CD clickwrap.  In CD clickwrap cases, however, 
the mandatory notice requirement converts to an obligation for notice 
that additional terms will be incorporated after purchase.94  Similarly, the 
ability to read and reject becomes the ability to return.95  The rationale 
behind these doctrines is found in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s 
decision in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the seminal case on CD 
Clickwrap.96 
In ProCD, Inc., the defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, purchased a 
CD-ROM directory database from the plaintiff, ProCD, and 
subsequently began utilizing the database for commercial purposes.  
ProCD filed suit against Zeidenberg alleging that Zeidenberg’s 
commercial use of its product violated the associated software license 
agreement.97  ProCD’s license accompanied the software both in the 
form of shrinkwrap as well as a typical clickwrap agreement that 
splashed across Zeidenberg’s computer screen each time the software 
was used.98  The clickwrap agreement barred a user of ProCD’s software 
from accessing the database services unless such user provided an 
affirmative assent to the software terms.99  Additionally, the outside of 
each box containing the software declared that the product would be 
subject to the license agreement contained within.100 
In asserting his case, Zeidenberg argued that a contract was formed 
with ProCD when he purchased the software, and, therefore, ProCD’s 
clickwrap agreement constituted additional terms to the contract that he 
had not accepted.  The Seventh Circuit agreed that a contract includes 
 
 94. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450–53 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 95. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450–53. 
 96. See i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337 (D. 
Mass. 2002); Jeang & Brooks, supra note 21, at 623; see also Condon, supra note 5, at 438. 
 97. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1447. 
 98. Although ProCD, Inc. contained the elements of both clickwrap and shrinkwrap, 
many cases and scholars still refer to ProCD, Inc. as a shrinkwrap case.  E.g., i.LAN Sys., Inc., 
183 F. Supp. 2d at 337; see Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 481–85. 
 99. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450. 
 100. Id. 
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only those terms that the parties have affirmatively agreed to and that a 
party cannot assent to hidden terms.101  The court held, however, that 
one of the terms to which Zeidenberg agreed to when he purchased the 
software was the inclusion of ProCD’s license agreement.102 
In substantiating its holding, the court highlighted a number of 
example transactions whereby the exchange of money precedes the 
communication of detailed terms, such as airline transportation, 
insurance contracts, and tickets to a concert or theatre.103  Simply 
because it was an electronic transaction, the court proclaimed, did not 
necessarily invalidate a “money now, terms later” agreement.104  The 
Seventh Circuit pointed out that a vendor cannot reasonably be 
expected to print its entire license agreement on the outside of its 
packages, and to do so would eliminate other information that buyers 
would presumably find more useful.105  The solution, according to the 
court, is for vendors to provide notice that additional terms will 
accompany the product and to provide a reasonable time period to 
return the accompanying product if such terms are deemed 
undesirable.106  “Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right 
to return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable,” the 
court declared, “may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers 
and sellers alike.”107  Accordingly, the court maintained that ProCD 
specifically extended to Zeidenberg such an opportunity to reject.  
“Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out the software, learned of 
the license, and did not reject the goods.”108  The court concluded, 
therefore, that CD clickwrap agreements, such as those utilized by 
ProCD, are “enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on 
grounds applicable to contracts in general.”109 
One year later, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its decision in ProCD, 
Inc. when it was faced with a shrinkwrap case in Hill v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc.110  In Hill, a consumer ordered a computer by phone from Gateway 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1451. 
 104. Id. at 1452. 
 105. Id. at 1450–51. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1451. 
 108. Id. at 1453. 
 109. Id. at 1449. 
 110. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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2000, Inc. (Gateway).111  When the computer arrived, it contained a 
shrinkwrap license agreement that governed the terms of purchase 
unless the computer was returned within thirty days.112  Although no 
details of terms were discussed when the consumer placed his phone 
order, the court pointed out that the consumer knew from Gateway’s 
advertisements that additional contractual terms would accompany the 
purchase.113  The court held that given notice of terms and a chance to 
inspect both the item and the terms, the consumer had affirmatively 
assented to Gateway’s license agreement when he kept the computer for 
more than the specified thirty-day return period.114  In confirming the 
ProCD, Inc. doctrine of “notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and 
a right to review and reject,” the Seventh Circuit in Hill established 
what has become known as the “layered contract” approach, whereby 
the timing of the contract’s execution is somewhat indefinite.115 
Nevertheless, in two additional cases involving “money now, terms 
later” agreements, the courts invalidated the vendors’ shrinkwrap 
agreements.116  Interestingly, the first case was extremely similar to Hill 
and also involved Gateway. 
2.  Unambiguous Assent:  Establishing Proper Notice of Subsequent 
Terms 
In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,117 the U.S. District Court of Kansas found 
Gateway’s shrinkwrap agreement to be unenforceable because Gateway 
failed to provide adequate notice that additional terms would be 
incorporated into the purchase.118  As in Hill, Gateway supplied the 
consumer with a computer that contained a shrinkwrap agreement 
stipulating that additional terms and conditions would be automatically 
incorporated into the purchase following the expiration of a five-day 
review and return period.119 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 
2000). 
 116. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000); Ariz. Retail Sys., 
Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
 117. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332. 
 118. Id. at 1341. 
 119. Id. 
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The court held the dispute to be governed by section 2-207 of the 
UCC,120 which provides that any additional terms proposed that are 
different from those offered and agreed upon constitute either an 
expression of acceptance or merely a written confirmation of 
agreement.121  By basing its decision on section 2-207, the court 
specifically rejected the reasoning established by the Seventh Circuit122 
in ProCD, Inc. and Hill.123  The Court declared that in both ProCD, Inc. 
and Hill, “the Seventh Circuit concluded without support that UCC § 2-
207 was irrelevant,” and that such a conclusion was in direct 
contradiction to the official comment to section 2-207.124  The court 
explicitly stated that it was “not persuaded . . . [to] follow the Seventh 
Circuit[’s] reasoning.”125  Somewhat ironically, however, the Klocek 
court did just that and based its ultimate decision on the “notice of 
subsequent terms” theory established in ProCD, Inc.126 
In holding Gateway’s agreement to be unenforceable, the court 
stated that there was “no evidence that . . . [Gateway] informed . . . [the 
consumer] of the five-day review-and-return period as a condition of the 
sales transaction, or that the parties contemplated additional terms to 
the agreement.”127  The court acknowledged that under section 2-207 of 
the UCC, it was possible to argue that Gateway’s shrinkwrap agreement 
was a conditional expression of acceptance constituting a counteroffer.128  
To constitute a valid counteroffer, however, the court held that 
Gateway was required to expressly make its acceptance conditional on 
the consumer’s assent to the additional or different terms.129  The court 
found that Gateway provided no indication that it was unwilling to 
 
 120. Id. at 1339. 
 121. Id. 
 122. The Seventh Circuit held that section 2-207 of the UCC applied only to a 
traditional “battle-of-the-forms” case.  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th 
Cir. 1996).  Because the dispute in the case involved a consumer transaction with only one 
form (the seller’s license), the court concluded that section 2-207 was irrelevant.  Id.  Instead, 
the court based its decision on section 2-204, which states that “[a] contract for the sale of 
goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both 
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”  Id. (quoting UNIF. COMMERCIAL 
CODE § 2-204(1) (amended 1993)). 
 123. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1339–40. 
 124. Id. at 1339. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1340–41. 
 127. Id. at 1341. 
 128. Id. at 1340. 
 129. Id. 
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proceed without the consumer’s agreement to its shrinkwrap.130  The 
court stated that “it is not unreasonable for a vendor to clearly 
communicate to a buyer—at the time of sale— . . . the fact that the 
vendor will propose additional terms as a condition of sale.”131  A seller, 
the court declared, must communicate to a purchaser an unwillingness 
to proceed in the absence of a buyer’s agreement to additional terms.132  
In the absence of such notice, the mere fact that the consumer kept the 
product longer than Gateway’s stipulated review and return period was 
not sufficient to establish unambiguous assent to Gateway’s terms.133 
3.  The Insufficiency of Notice Without the Ability to Reject and Return 
Regardless of how conspicuously a seller displays the terms of its CD 
clickwrap agreement, the contract will not be held enforceable if the 
buyer was given no opportunity to reject the terms of the agreement and 
return the product.134  The court’s reasoning in Arizona Retail Systems, 
Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.135 emphatically illustrates this point. 
In Arizona Retail Systems, Inc., the court both upheld and dismissed 
two types of shrinkwrap agreements that were coupled with identical 
software and purchased by the same buyer from the same company.136  
The seller in this case, The Software Link, Inc., had shipped the buyer 
its software containing a shrinkwrap license agreement, but had done so 
without a notice that additional terms would be incorporated into the 
software purchase.137  On the initial purchase, the seller shipped both a 
test version of the software as well as a live, functional version.138  The 
language printed on the software package stated that by opening the 
software, the user would be bound by all terms of the license 
incorporated inside.139  Nevertheless, the court upheld the shrinkwrap 
agreement in the initial purchase because the test software module 
enabled the user to accept or reject the live version of the software prior 
 
 130. Id. at 1341. 
 131. Id. at 1341 n.14. 
 132. Id. at 1340 (quoting Brown Mach., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1989)). 
 133. Id. at 1341. 
 134. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 430 (2d Cir. 2004); Boomer v. 
AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 414–15 (7th Cir. 2002); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, 
Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763–66 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
 135. Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 763–66. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 760–62. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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to its installation.140  When the same user made subsequent purchases of 
the software, however, the product did not include a module that 
provided the user an opportunity to either refuse or consent to the 
license.141  The court held the subsequent shrinkwrap license to be 
invalid because it failed to provide the purchaser of the software an 
opportunity to review and reject the software and the terms of 
purchase.142  The court asserted that the shrinkwrap constituted 
proposed modifications to the contract by the seller, and under section 
2-209 of the UCC, assent to such proposed contractual modifications 
must be express.143 
The second software purchase in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. points 
out the insufficiency of mere notice of terms.144  The buyer in this case 
knew from the first purchase that terms would be forthcoming on the 
second shipment.145  By stipulating that the terms became effective upon 
opening the software, however, the seller eliminated the buyer’s 
opportunity to review and reject the license agreement.146  As numerous 
courts have found, CD clickwrap agreements can bind a consumer only 
when that consumer is given both prior notice that additional terms will 
be incorporated into the agreement and a right to read and reject such 
terms if they are deemed unacceptable.147  Such a right to “read and 
reject” is imperative to sufficiently show mutual assent.148  Provided that 
notice is given, therefore, clicking on an “I agree” icon will be 
considered explicit assent if the user is afforded (1) a chance to inspect 
both the items and the terms, and (2) an opportunity to reject such 
terms by returning the product for a full refund.149 
 
 140. Id. at 764. 
 141. Id. at 764–65. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 764. 
 144. Id. at 764–65. 
 145. See generally id. at 759. 
 146. Id. at 764–65. 
 147. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. 
Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 336–37 (D. Mass. 2002); Klocek v. Gateway, 
Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software 
Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 312–13 (Wash. 2000). 
 148. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 365 F.3d 393, 430 (2d Cir. 2004); ProCD, Inc., 86 
F.3d at 1451; Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341. 
 149. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc., 86 
F.3d at 1451; Mortenson Co., 998 P.2d at 312–13. 
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4.  Reconciling Disparity in CD Clickwrap 
Regardless of whether clickwrap agreements are reviewed as part of 
a “layered contract,” as proposed modifications, or as counteroffers 
under the UCC, the key element is explicit assent.  This explicit assent 
cannot be established without the ability to reject.150  Although the court 
decisions discussed above may be conflicting in their final holdings, the 
differences in legal reasoning between the courts may not be as 
divergent as it would first appear.  In the final analysis, these cases 
actually are in agreement that a prior contract of some kind was, in fact, 
formed.151  In upholding the validity of clickwrap agreements, for 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that when 
the buyer purchased the software, one of the terms the buyer agreed to 
was that the purchase contract was subject to the additional terms of the 
seller’s license agreement.152  The court also declared that a buyer 
cannot agree to hidden terms.153  It can be argued that the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision viewed the original purchase contract as one in which 
the buyer agreed to the review and possible inclusion of the seller’s 
additional terms.154  The court in Klocek, conversely, held that the 
original purchase agreement contained no presence of provisions 
incorporating the possible inclusion of additional terms.155  
Consequently, the Klocek court held the associated shrinkwrap 
agreement to be unenforceable.156  Most interesting, however, was the 
decision in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc., in which the court found one 
software license to contain the ability to reject while another license for 
the same software did not.157  The court, therefore, invalidated one 
contract while enforcing the other.158 
 
 150. See Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 759. 
 151. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447; Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332; Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc., 831 
F. Supp. 759. 
 152. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1447. 
 155. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340–41. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763–66 (D. Ariz. 
1993). 
 158. Id. 
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5.  Clarifying Notice of Subsequent Terms and the Proper Period of 
Review 
The primary variables, it appears, are not the relevant UCC sections 
or whether a “layered contract” exists, but rather the methodology 
utilized by the seller in communicating its wish to incorporate 
subsequent terms and the time period given to the consumer to review 
the terms.  Given these variables, two key issues arise:  (a) the required 
clarity of notice in communicating such terms, and (b) the length of time 
a buyer must reasonably be given to review the terms. 
a.  Clarity of Notice 
In discussing the issue of notice, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held ProCD’s clickwrap agreement to be enforceable, in 
part, because it specifically communicated the subsequent inclusion of 
the seller’s full license agreement.159  One year later, however, in Hill, 
the Seventh Circuit required only a notice that some additional terms 
would be included.160  Alternatively, in the District of Kansas, the court 
declared that a vendor must clearly communicate the inclusion of its 
standard terms.161  Similarly, in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc., the court 
proclaimed that a seller must communicate to the buyer the subsequent 
inclusion of any terms it deems essential.162  Although the Seventh 
Circuit in Hill was somewhat lenient in the notice methodology 
required, counsel should be forewarned that most clickwrap cases have 
compelled the seller to clearly and conspicuously communicate intent to 
include subsequent terms.163 
 
 159. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450. 
 160. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that prior 
advertisements that included certain terms, such as warranties and disclaimers, constituted 
sufficient notice to a buyer placing a phone order that there would be inclusion of subsequent 
terms). 
 161. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340–41 (holding that because the seller did not clearly 
communicate to the buyer that the contract was subject to additional terms, the contract was 
unenforceable). 
 162. Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 765 & n.3 (holding that a shrinkwrap 
agreement was unenforceable because the subsequent inclusion of terms was not made 
apparent to the buyer at the time of acceptance). 
 163. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 430 (2d Cir. 2004); Specht v. 
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30–32 (2d Cir. 2002); Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 
1340–41; Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 
525390, at *1–3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), aff’d, 2 F. App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2001); Ariz. Retail 
Sys., Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 765. 
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b.  Determining a Reasonable Length of Review 
Much like what constitutes conspicuous notice, the required period 
of review also seems somewhat unclear.  Granted, courts have made it 
evident that the period for the review of terms must be reasonable.164  
For instance, in rejecting the seller’s shrinkwrap agreement, the court in 
Klocek noted a critical difference between the thirty-day return period 
in the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hill and the five-day return period 
involved in its case.165  Nevertheless, neither the Hill decision nor other 
judgments have established a minimum requisite time period for a user’s 
review of enforceable clickwrap terms.166 
Considering the current state of clickwrap case law, it is doubtful 
such a review period will be defined by the courts at any time in the 
near future.  As the court in Caspi pointed out, reasonable notice, to 
include an adequate period to reject, is a question of law for courts to 
decide.167  Nevertheless, in reviewing CD clickwrap agreements that 
courts have deemed enforceable, it seems safe to assume that courts 
would consider a thirty-day review period to be reasonable.168 
6.  The Ability to Reject and Freedom to Contract 
The “ability to reject” requirement, as it relates to clickwrap, results 
in an additional intriguing issue related to the standardized format and 
lack of negotiation in clickwrap.  A contractual process, after all, has its 
greatest appeal when two parties are allowed to freely negotiate their 
associated benefits from the bargain.169  Such bargaining theoretically 
leads to a mutual assent and a meeting of the minds.170  Clickwrap 
 
 164. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1999). 
 165. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. 
 166. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450–51 (7th Cir. 1996); Caspi, 732 A.2d at 532–33. 
 167. Caspi, 732 A.2d at 532–33; see also, e.g., Motise v. Am. Online, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 
563 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 168. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1998) (holding that the plaintiff’s decision to retain the product beyond the specified thirty-
day return period constituted acceptance of the defendant’s agreement). 
 169. Vincent M. Roche, “Bashing the Corporate Shield”:  The Untenable Evisceration of 
Freedom of Contract in the Corporate Context, 28 J. CORP. L. 289, 292 (2003). 
 170. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc., 460 U.S. 824, 864 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
Hatch v. Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124, 133 (1879); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately 
Legislated Intellectual Property Rights:  Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good 
Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 906 (2003); Nicholas S. Shantar, Note, Forum 
Selection Clauses:  Damages in Lieu of Dismissal?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1063, 1080 (2002). 
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agreements, however, do not necessarily represent a meeting of the 
minds traditionally present in conventional contracts.171  A clickwrap 
agreement only provides the user with the ability to accept or reject the 
contract; negotiation, in the traditional sense, is generally not possible.172  
The following question then arises:  What is the impact on a clickwrap 
agreement when one party feels it has no choice but to accept the 
agreement?  Such contracts are typically referred to as contracts of 
adhesion,173 and the nature of clickwrap agreements makes them 
inherently associated with such a label.174 
III.  CLICKWRAP AS A CONTRACT OF ADHESION:  THE BENEFIT OF A 
STANDARDIZED CONTRACT VERSUS UNCONSCIONABLE TERMS 
A.  Defining Clickwrap as an Adhesion Contract:  Standardized Terms, 
No Negotiation, and Unequal Bargaining Power 
A contract of adhesion is generally defined as a standardized 
contract, imposed by a party of superior bargaining strength, that 
provides the other party only the ability to reject or accept it.175  
Clickwrap agreements, by definition, fall into such a category.  
Clickwrap agreements are, after all, typically standardized contracts that 
are executed with no negotiation between the parties.176  As should be 
expected, however, it would be a mistake to assume that such 
categorization alone invalidates a clickwrap agreement. 
B.  Validating Standardized Contracts:  The Requirement of a 
“Reasonable Expectation” of Negotiation 
The U.S. Supreme Court made it clear in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. 
v. Shute177 that the enforceability of a contract is not necessarily tied to 
 
 171. Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 492; Reichman & Franklin, supra note 170, at 906. 
 172. See Roche, supra note 169. 
 173. Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (defining 
contract of adhesion as a “standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of 
a superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to 
adhere to the contract or reject it” (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Serv., 6 
P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000))); Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Lopez, 162 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi 2005, no pet.). 
 174. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; Condon, supra note 5, at 436. 
 175. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 
572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Serv. Corp. Int’l, 162 S.W.3d at 809; Condon, supra note 5, at 436. 
 176. Condon, supra note 5, at 434. 
 177. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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negotiated terms.178  In Carnival, the Court addressed the enforceability 
of a standardized form contract set forth on a cruise line ticket.179  A 
purchaser of such a ticket argued that the terms on the ticket should not 
be enforced because the terms were not the product of an open 
negotiation.180  The Court held, however, that it must be reasonable to 
expect negotiation, and it would be entirely unreasonable to presume 
negotiations should occur on contracts that are purely routine and 
nearly identical to every other contract a seller has issued.181  The Court 
asserted that “[c]ommon sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a 
form contract, the terms of which are not subject to negotiation and that 
an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining parity with 
[the seller].”182  The significance of Carnival to clickwrap agreements 
should not be understated.  ProCD, Inc. and numerous other clickwrap 
cases have cited Carnival when addressing the enforceability of the 
standardized contract format inherent in clickwrap.183  In Carnival, as 
well as in the clickwrap and shrinkwrap cases that followed, courts 
stressed the pragmatism and possible functional benefits that 
nonnegotiable standardized contracts could offer.184 
C.  The Practical Benefit of Standardized Contracts 
In ProCD, Inc., the court emphasized that standardized contracts 
are essential to a system of mass production and distribution and are 
valuable to buyers and sellers alike.185  One cannot, according to the 
court, expect a seller to place its entire agreement on the outside of its 
merchandise.186  By placing notice of terms on the outside and providing 
the buyer an opportunity to review and reject such terms, the court 
maintained that scarce resources can then be devoted to an entire class 
of transactions rather than expended in negotiating the details of a 
single contract.187  “[A]djusting terms in buyers’ favor,” the court 
 
 178. Id. at 592–94. 
 179. Id. at 593. 
 180. Id. at 590. 
 181. Id. at 592–93. 
 182. Id. at 593. 
 183. ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996); Brower v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Condon, supra note 5, at 437–39. 
 184. Carnival, 499 U.S. at 594; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1451; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 
572; Condon, supra note 5, at 437–38. 
 185. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1451. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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asserted, “might help . . . [that particular buyer,] but would lead to a 
response, such as a higher price, that might make consumers as a whole 
worse off.”188  In Hill, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reiterated its holding in ProCD, Inc., by stating that “[p]ractical 
considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms 
with their products.”189  The Seventh Circuit’s line of thought was 
consistent with the reasoning in Carnival that buyers purchasing 
standardized contracts may benefit from reduced pricing as a result of 
minimized negotiation costs.190 
D.  Judicial Scrutiny and the Protection of Competition from Holdings of 
Unconscionable Terms 
Although courts have rejected the notion that the enforceability of a 
contract is tied to open bargaining, courts have also been clear that 
standardized contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental 
fairness.191  Generally, contracts that are the result of open negotiations 
and are unaffected by fraud or undue influence are given full effect by 
the courts.192  Courts, however, have placed heightened scrutiny on the 
terms of standardized form contracts that are offered on a “take it or 
leave it” basis by a party of unequally strong bargaining power.193  
Nevertheless, courts have also held that the availability of alternative 
sources may defeat the argument that a contract is unenforceable on the 
basis of adhesion.194  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
stated, “[c]ompetition among vendors, not judicial revision of a 
[contract’s packaging], is how consumers are protected in a market 
economy.”195  A New York appellate court reiterated the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding and maintained that given “the ability to make the 
purchase elsewhere and the express option to return the goods, the 
consumer is not in a ‘take it or leave it’ position at all.”196 
 
 188. Id. at 1453. 
 189. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 190. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991). 
 191. Id. at 595; Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 203 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2001, pet. denied). 
 192. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1972). 
 193. Carnival, 499 U.S. at 595; Barnett, 38 S.W.3d at 204. 
 194. Carnival, 499 U.S. at 595; ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 
1996); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Brower v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 195. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453. 
 196. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572. 
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If competition assures enforceability, one might assume that a lack 
of competition would invalidate a contract of adhesion, such as 
clickwrap.  To hold an adhesion contract unenforceable, however, the 
critical factors to be considered are associated with the doctrine of 
unconscionability.197 
E.  Establishing Unconscionable Terms in the Absence of Competition 
1.  The Requirement to Prove Both Procedural and Substantive 
Unconscionability 
A lack of competition will invalidate a contract only if the contract 
was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable when made.198  
A lack of competition with no negotiation possibilities in a typical 
contract of adhesion, such as clickwrap, will meet the criteria for 
procedural unconscionability.199  Moreover, a claim of procedural 
unconscionability cannot be defeated by just any showing of possible 
competition.200  There must be reasonable competition and an ability to 
secure substantially similar products or services as those in question.201 
Even if an agreement is procedurally unconscionable, it may 
nonetheless be enforceable if the substantive terms are reasonable.202  A 
determination of substantive unconscionability requires proof of overly 
harsh or one-sided terms that “shock the conscience.”203  In upholding 
the validity of a forum clause in a clickwrap agreement, for instance, a 
Texas appellate court held that even in cases of monopolies, “[i]t is the 
unfair use of, not the mere existence of, an unequal bargaining power 
that undermines a contract.”204  Accordingly, invalidating clickwrap on 
the basis of substantive unconscionability requires evidence that an 
unfair use of superior bargaining power resulted in contractual 
conditions so exceedingly calloused as to be unreasonably burdensome 
to the agreeing party.205 
 
 197. Id. at 573–74. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–73; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573–74. 
 200. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–73. 
 201. Id.    
 202. Id.; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573–74. 
 203. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 
998 P.2d 305, 314 (Wash. 2000). 
 204. Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, 
pet. denied) (emphasis added). 
 205. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–73, 1176–77; Mortenson Co., 998 P.2d at 314–16. 
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Several courts have held clickwrap terms to be unenforceable on the 
basis of the unconscionability doctrine.206  Nevertheless, such cases serve 
only to reinforce the validity of clickwrap, as it was the terms of the 
contract, not the clickwrap agreement, itself, that was held to be 
unenforceable.207 
2.  Demonstrating Substantive Unconscionability 
In Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., for instance, the court concluded 
that the arbitration clause of Gateway 2000, Inc. (Gateway) was 
unconscionable on the basis of an unreasonable cost to the plaintiff.208  
Gateway’s agreement required that all disputes relating to the 
agreement be settled by arbitration conducted in Chicago, Illinois, by an 
official arbitrator of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).209  
The ICC’s headquarters, however, was located in France, and contact 
with the ICC could be made only through the U.S. Council for 
International Business.210  Additionally, the ICC required an advance fee 
of $4,000 (more than the product in question), of which $2,000 was 
nonrefundable.211  The consumer was also required to pay all of 
Gateway’s legal fees should Gateway prevail at the arbitration.212  The 
court held that the excessive cost necessitated by such an arbitration 
provision was unreasonable and served to deter consumers from seeking 
the appropriate dispute resolution process.213 
While the court in Brower held a clickwrap provision to be 
unenforceable, the court in Comb v. PayPal, Inc. held that PayPal’s 
clickwrap agreement was so one-sided in its entirety that it was 
substantively unconscionable.214  PayPal’s clickwrap agreement 
authorized PayPal to freeze customer accounts and retain funds that it 
alone determined were subject to dispute.215  Additionally, PayPal 
utilized such a practice without notice to its customers.216  As the court 
noted, PayPal’s customers were allowed to resolve disputes only after 
 
 206. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–77; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574–75. 
 207. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1171–72; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571–72. 
 208. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574–75. 
 209. Id. at 570. 
 210. Id. at 571. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 574–75. 
 214. Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1173–77 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 215. Id. at 1173. 
 216. Id. 
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PayPal had control over their disputed funds for an indefinite period.217  
The clickwrap agreement also allowed PayPal to modify or amend the 
agreement without notification and required customers to be bound by 
any such modification.218  Moreover, PayPal’s arbitration clause 
prohibited customers from consolidating their claims and, for many of 
the same reasons cited in Brower, was also found to be unreasonably 
cost-prohibitive.219  The court found that PayPal had shown no 
“‘business realities’ [to] justify such one-sidedness.”220  Consequently, 
the court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, 
PayPal’s clickwrap agreement was substantively unconscionable and 
unenforceable.221 
In neither Brower nor Comb, however, did the courts rule that the 
related agreements were unenforceable because of their format.222  On 
the contrary, both courts held that clickwrap or shrinkwrap agreements 
were generally enforceable as contractual documents.223  In fact, when 
referencing the enforceability of clickwrap and shrinkwrap agreements, 
the Brower court specifically cited both Hill and ProCD, Inc. and 
asserted that the commonality of such agreements now enables “the 
consumer to make purchases of sophisticated merchandise . . . over the 
phone or by mail—and even by computer.”224 
F.  The Lesson in Applying the Unconscionable Doctrine:  Clickwrap 
Plays by the Same Rules as Any Other Contract 
Whether it is an agreement executed on paper, established on the 
Internet, or by other electronic means, the doctrine of adhesion is 
applied no differently.225  Invalidating a clickwrap agreement, as with 
any other contract, requires not only a showing of procedural 
unconscionability (which clickwrap meets), but also a showing of 
 
 217. Id. at 1175. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1175–77; Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574–75 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1998). 
 220. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 
 221. Id. at 1177. 
 222. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1171–72; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571–72. 
 223. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1171–72; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571–72. 
 224. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571–72 (citing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 
1148–49 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 225. See Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1171–72; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571–73; Barnett v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet. denied). 
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substantive unconscionability.226  Findings of unenforceability, however, 
have been limited, and courts have noted that the theory of 
unconscionability is not intended as a vortex for elements of fairness 
embodied by other existing law.227  Provided, therefore, that the terms of 
a clickwrap agreement are reasonable, then the conspicuous notice of 
terms and the ability to review and reject such terms will establish the 
enforceability of clickwrap.228  As the Seventh Circuit has stated, these 
types of agreements “are enforceable unless their terms are 
objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”229 
Nonetheless, the concept of negotiation raises a final significant 
question with regard to clickwrap agreements, specifically as the 
concept relates to CD clickwrap.  Because the terms of CD clickwrap 
typically arise subsequent to the parties’ initial transaction, it is entirely 
possible that a negotiated written agreement may exist prior to the 
appearance of such clickwrap terms.  If such agreement exists, it would 
seem, at least on the surface, that the terms of any subsequent clickwrap 
agreement would be considered merely an attempt to incorporate 
additional terms, and such terms would be of no effect without the 
party’s explicit assent.  Considering the fact-based analysis of clickwrap 
case law, however, such circumstances require further exploration. 
IV.  PRIOR WRITTEN AGREEMENTS:  DOES THEIR EXISTENCE 
AUTOMATICALLY INVALIDATE A SUBSEQUENT CLICKWRAP 
CONTRACT? 
A.  General Rules and the UCC:  Determining Final Intent of the Parties 
Is a Question of Fact 
If an executed agreement already exists, section 2-209 of the UCC 
requires an express acceptance of any proposed supplemental contract 
terms, and such express assent cannot be inferred merely from a party’s 
conduct.230  When specific terms are not expressed between merchants 
until after the contract is formed, UCC section 2-207 governs the 
 
 226. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1171–72; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573–74; Barnett, 38 
S.W.3d at 204. 
 227. M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 316 (Wash. 
2000); see Condon, supra note 5, at 455. 
 228. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449, 1451–53; Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 
831 F. Supp. 759, 763–66 (D. Ariz. 1993); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 
1010–11 (D.C. 2002); Mortenson Co., 998 P.2d at 313–14, 316. 
 229. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449 (referring to shrinkwrap agreements). 
 230. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000); Ariz. Retail 
Sys., Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 764. 
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interpretation of the contract, and such terms, to the extent they 
materially alter the parties’ agreement, are not incorporated into the 
parties’ final agreement.231  Determining which written document the 
parties actually intended to represent their final integrated agreement is 
determined on a case-by-case basis.232  Consequently, whether the 
parties intended a particular written document to be the final expression 
of their contract terms is a question of fact and, in determining such a 
question, the courts may analyze the various circumstances surrounding 
the formation of such a contract.233 
B.  The Importance of Explicit Terms 
The query is whether clickwrap constitutes additional supplemental 
terms to a prior written agreement that must be expressly accepted by 
the parties, or, conversely, whether clickwrap terms can serve to fill the 
gaps in an existing contract, thereby allowing such terms to be 
incorporated into an existing agreement.  The two cases discussed below 
help answer these questions. 
1.  Trumping Clickwrap with Unambiguous Agreements and Integration 
Clauses 
In Morgan Laboratories, Inc. v. Micro Data Base Systems, Inc.,234 the 
parties entered into an agreement in 1991 that contained an integration 
clause explicitly precluding any modifications to the contract without 
the written consent of the parties.235  The defendant, Micro Data Base 
Systems, Inc., claimed that the terms of its shrinkwrap license 
constituted necessary supplemental terms to the 1991 agreement 
because such agreement did not contain certain specific provisions 
found in the shrinkwrap license—that is, it did not contain the forum 
clause.236  Additionally, the defendant asserted that Morgan 
Laboratories accepted the additional shrinkwrap terms through its 
course of conduct.237  The court held, however, that a course of conduct 
does not replace a “no modification unless in writing” provision.238  
 
 231. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 232. Mortenson Co., 998 P.2d at 311. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Morgan Labs., Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys., Inc., No. C96-3998 THE, 1997 WL 
258886, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1997). 
 235. Id. at *2–3. 
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 238. Id. at *3. 
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Assent must be express and cannot be inferred merely from conduct.239  
The court maintained that although shrinkwrap may be enforceable, it 
cannot trump explicit prior agreements when those agreements contain 
a valid integration clause.240 
2.  Upholding Clickwrap:  Filling the Void Left by Ambiguous Terms 
and a Prior Course of Conduct 
M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp. demonstrated that 
a prior course of conduct can indeed prove relevant when an existing 
agreement is void of critical terms, specifically an integration clause.241  
Plaintiff M.A. Mortenson Co. (Mortenson) issued a purchase order to 
Timberline Software Corp. (Timberline) for an upgrade of its existing 
software system.242  Mortenson was a construction contractor that 
utilized Timberline’s bid analysis software when responding to 
construction bids.243  Mortenson had utilized Timberline’s software for 
three years prior to initiating its purchase order to Timberline for an 
upgraded system.244  Mortenson subsequently brought suit against 
Timberline for breach of warranties and alleged that the upgraded 
software was defective.245  Timberline moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that the limitation for damages set forth in its clickwrap 
agreement barred Mortenson’s recovery.246  Mortenson countered that 
the purchase order consisted of the entire contract between the parties 
and that Mortenson, therefore, never affirmatively agreed to 
Timberline’s clickwrap agreement.247 
The court held that the purchase order was not an integrated 
contract and that the terms of the clickwrap agreement were 
enforceable against Mortenson.248  In reaching its conclusion, the court 
specifically pointed to the prior “course of dealing” between the 
parties.249  The court noted, for instance, that Mortenson had to 
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explicitly assent to the software license by clicking “I agree” prior to 
accessing the software services and had completed such transactions on 
numerous occasions over the three years it had utilized Timberline’s 
software.250 
Just as important, however, was the court’s determination that 
Mortenson’s purchase order failed as an integrated contract based on 
the absence of an integration clause and lack of certain explicit terms.251  
The court pointed out that the purchase order set an hourly rate for 
software support, but the purchase order failed to specify how many 
hours of support were included.252  Similarly, the purchase order 
established that the software would be updated, but the pricing for such 
upgrades was to be determined later.253  Moreover, the court asserted 
that the “presence of an integration clause [in a contract] strongly 
supports a conclusion that the parties’ agreement was fully 
integrated.”254 
Accordingly, the court found that because no such clause was 
contained in Mortenson’s purchase order and because the contract was 
lacking in certain critical terms, the logical conclusion was that the 
contract was not intended as the complete and final agreement between 
the parties.255  The court determined, therefore, that the existence of the 
prior purchase order did not invalidate the subsequent clickwrap 
terms.256  In fact, the terms of Timberline’s clickwrap agreement, 
according to the court, served to fill the gaps present in Mortenson’s 
purchase order.257  Consequently, the court held that when Mortenson 
clicked “I agree” and began utilizing the software, Mortenson explicitly 
assented to the terms of Timberline’s clickwrap agreement.258 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 311. 
 252. Id. 
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 257. Id. at 310–11. 
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C.  Notes of Caution While Reinforcing the Validity of Clickwrap 
Considering the holdings in Mortenson Co. and Morgan 
Laboratories, Inc., a word of warning is appropriate.  When the 
possibility for a subsequent clickwrap contract is present, counsel, 
contract officers, and purchasing officials must all be aware of the 
impact their contract formation, specifically their contract provisions, 
may have on the enforceability of the clickwrap agreement.  In fact, it 
seems advisable in such circumstances to specifically reject a party’s 
clickwrap agreement within the integration clause of a contract. 
Nonetheless, the holdings above reinforce the validity of clickwrap 
as a method of contracting.  If the enforceability of clickwrap terms can 
be questioned, much less upheld when a prior agreement exists, then it 
stands to reason that clickwrap can certainly be deemed enforceable 
under normal contractual circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
A preliminary review of clickwrap court decisions could lead one to 
assume that a great deal of uncertainty and discrepancy exists in this 
area of the law.  Upon further analysis, however, it becomes clear that 
such discrepancies are based more on interpretation of facts than 
differences in legal reasoning.  Although the final judgments of the 
various courts may seem disparate, the courts have applied basic 
contract law in determining the enforceability of clickwrap agreements, 
and their legal reasoning has been consistent.259 
Basic contract law doctrines require a manifestation of agreement 
between the parties.260  Such manifestation of assent cannot occur unless 
there exists a prior opportunity to review and reject the terms of the 
agreement.261  Additionally, a party must be given reasonable notice of 
such terms prior to securing the related products or services.262  In all the 
clickwrap cases reviewed above, the courts consistently applied these 
standard principles of contract law.  As the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit pointed out, “[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the 
existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to 
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those terms are essential” to maintain the integrity of electronic 
transactions.263 
Similarly, courts have applied basic contract law in approaching 
questions of “adhesion” inherent in clickwrap agreements.  To hold a 
contract of adhesion unenforceable, it must be shown that the contract 
was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.264  Again, 
courts have been consistent in their application of this doctrine when 
reviewing clickwrap disputes.  Although a clickwrap agreement, in the 
absence of reasonable competition, may meet the criteria of procedural 
unconscionability, a showing of substantive unconscionability is still 
required to find the agreement unenforceable.265  As a result, courts 
have found clickwrap agreements unenforceable on this basis in only a 
limited number of circumstances.266 
Unless a clickwrap agreement is specifically precluded by the 
existence of a previous contract, the clickwrap agreement will be upheld 
if its terms are not found unconscionable and the agreement is 
otherwise compliant with standard contractual requirements.  As the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly phrased it, a 
clickwrap agreement will be held “enforceable unless [its] terms are 
objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”267  In other 
words, counsel, purchasers, and contract officers should be aware that 
objections to clickwrap are no different than objections to any other 
forms of contracting.  In establishing this principle, the courts have been 
clear and their legal reasoning consistent. 
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